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By successfully exploiting human vulnerabilities, fake websites have emerged as a major source of online fraud. 
Fake websites continue to inflict exorbitant monetary losses and also have significant ramifications for online 
security.  We explore the process by which salient performance-related elements could increase the reliance 
on protective tools and, thus, reduce the success rate of fake websites. We develop the theory of detection 
tool impact (DTI) for this investigation by borrowing and contextualizing the protection motivation theory. Based 
on the DTI theory, we conceptualize a model to investigate how salient performance and cost-related 
elements of detection tools could influence users’ perceptions of the tools and threats, efficacy in dealing with 
threats, and reliance on such tools.  The research method was a controlled lab experiment with a novel and 
extensive experimental design and protocol in two distinct domains: online pharmacies and banks.  We found 
that the detector accuracy and speed, reflecting in response efficacy as perceived by users, form the pivotal 
coping mechanism in dealing with security threats and are major conduits for transforming salient performance-
related elements into increased reliance on the detector. Furthermore, reported reliance on the detector 
showed a significant impact on the users’ performance in terms of self-protection.  Therefore, users’ perceived 
response efficacy should be used as a critical metric to evaluate the design, assess the performance, and 
promote the use of fake-website detectors. We also found that cost of detector error had profound impacts on 
threat perceptions. We discuss the significant theoretical and empirical implications of the findings. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most vulnerable points in the online security process is when users decide to visit and use 
a website (Schneier, 2000). Semantic attacks focus on “targeting the people” instead of exploiting 
hardware and software vulnerabilities as done by many other Internet security attacks, such as 
viruses, denial of service, and malware (Schneier, 2000). In such attacks, users’ unpredictable 
behaviors play a critical role (Cranor, 2008; Kumaraguru, Sheng, Aquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010). 
Fake websites take advantage of this weak point in the security loop by posing as legitimate providers 
of information, goods, and services. As such, they rely on meaningful content to exploit weaknesses 
in human recognition of such attacks (Schneier, 2000). 
 
Fake websites generate billions of dollars in fraudulent revenue by exploiting such human 
vulnerabilities (Zhang, Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 2007) and are estimated to comprise nearly 20 
percent of the Web (Gyongyi & Garcia-Molina, 2005). Fake websites offering harmful anti-virus 
software have defrauded 43 million users (Willis, 2009). According to an FDA study, less than 10 
percent of the 12,000 Internet pharmacies examined were legitimate (Krebs, 2005). Moreover, the 
problem has worldwide reach; recently, a group of fraudsters in China developed fake military 
hospital websites used to defraud over 10,000 people (An, 2010). A 2011 Gartner report notes that 
phishing attacks using fake websites remain one of the biggest forms of Internet fraud for individuals 
and organizations (Gartner, 2011). Even more damaging than the immediate monetary losses is the 
potential for identity theft, where the personal information is used to open additional accounts 
(McAfee, 2011b). Javelin Strategy (2014) has reported that more than 13 million people were the 
victim of identity theft in 2013. In such situations, the direct monetary losses account for only 10 
percent of the total fraud cost, with remediation and reputation costs (e.g., impact on credit 
scores/ratings) encompassing the majority of the losses (Lennon, 2011).  
 
Fake websites also have dire ramifications for Internet users’ health and wellness. According to 
studies conducted by the World Health Organization and other organizations, numerous deaths have 
been attributed to fake medical websites, while the number of people visiting such sites continues to 
increase dramatically (Easton, 2007; Armin, 2010). Consequently, in addition to monetary losses, 
fake websites have negative long-term trust and security-related implications at the global level 
(Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal, 2004).  
  
Countering fake-website attacks requires warning and educating users (Kumaraguru, 2009; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2010). Fake-website detection tools are designed to warn users. Repeated use of 
detection tools could also increase users’ confidence in their own abilities to spot and avoid attacks. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of such tools is predicated on their use (Wu, Miller, & Garfunkel, 2006). 
To this end, we use a user-centered approach to investigate the relations between critical tool 
elements and the actual reliance on fake-website detection tools.  
 
Few studies have examined how performance-related elements and cost of error could influence 
users’ security perceptions and reliance on protective IT artifacts. We define protective IT artifacts as 
a type of IT artifact that protects users from damages caused by malicious software and fake 
websites. This definition is similar to Dinev and Hu’s (2007) but extended to explicitly include fake 
websites. Given the significance of fake websites in terms of the hefty monetary loss and social costs 
inflicted, such an extension is warranted (Dinev, 2006; Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 
2007; Abbasi, Zhang, Zimbra, Chen, & Nunamaker, 2010; Xiao & Benbasat, 2011). Previous studies 
have investigated how users react to the interfaces of fake-website detection tools (Wu et al., 2006) 
and salient interface design elements for such tools (Chen, Zahedi, & Abbasi, 2011). Others have 
analyzed the effectiveness of a particular warning message, such as the SSL warning (Sunshine, 
Egelman, Almuhimedi, Atri, & Cranor, 2009) and new models or methods that assist with users’ 
security-critical decision making process (Cranor, 2008). These studies have been exploratory for the 
most part and provide limited theoretical insights regarding individuals’ reactions. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is among the first to investigate the salient elements related to detection tools’ 
performance (benefit), cost of error, and context-sensitive factors (domain and threat types) that could 
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influence people’s reliance on tools in protecting themselves against fake-website attacks. To do so, 
we pose the following specific research questions: do a tool’s salient elements impact users’ reliance 
on the tool and their self-protection performance? If so, what is the process by which such elements 
alter users’ behaviors and self-protection performance? Do context-sensitive elements of detection 
tools influence the above process? 
 
In formulating the conceptual model to address the research questions, we draw on the protection 
motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) and extend the theory by contextualizing it to 
include context-specific factors salient to fake-website detection tools’ performance and users’ self-
protection performance. A novel experimental design, with extensive stimuli development using 
carefully identified fake websites, guided the data collection for this study.  
 
This paper makes important and novel theoretical and empirical contributions. Our research uncovers 
the process by which the salient elements of fake-website detection tools influence users’ coping 
appraisals, alter their threat perceptions, and impact their reliance on the tool and self-protection 
performance. We extend protection motivation theory (PMT) to contextualize it to account for the 
context-specificity of the salient tool elements and users’ reliance and performance as well as for the 
context-sensitivity of domains and threat types. Based on this theoretical framework, our work shows 
how fake-website detection tools’ performance-related elements must be enhanced and marketed to 
promote their use. Particularly, tools’ benefits in terms of their accuracy and speed boost users’ 
coping appraisal and constitute critical factors in the design of detection tools. On the other hand, the 
perceived cost of tools’ error increases users’ threat appraisals. The resultant users’ perceived 
response and self-efficacy are the pivotal coping mechanism in dealing with security threats posed by 
fake websites and are major conduits for transforming users’ perceptions of performance-related 
elements into their increased reliance on such tools.  
2. Theory Development 
We base our theory development on the core constructs of protection motivation theory (PMT), which 
we contextualize to fake-website threats and tools to counter them. We extend the core PMT 
constructs to include tools’ performance (benefit) and cost of error, users’ reliance on the detector 
and their success in self-protection against online threats. We refer to this contextualized PMT as the 
detection tool impact (DTI) theory. 
 
Whetten, Felin, and King (2009) categorize theory borrowing into two types: vertical and horizontal. 
Vertical borrowing changes the level of analysis and abstraction, whereas horizontal borrowing 
moves across contexts. We use the latter in this study. Contextualization has emerged as a valuable 
approach in theory development, which makes it possible to identify distinguishing features and 
boundary conditions of the theory (Whetten, 2009, Hong, Chan, Thong, Chasalow, & Dhillon, 2014), 
which enhances the borrowed theory, contributes to the emergence of context-specific theories 
(Whetten, 2009), and leads to a deeper understanding of the “why” and “where” of theory building 
(Johns, 2006).  
 
Whetten (2009, p. 29) distinguishes between “context specificity” and “context sensitivity” of theories. 
Context specificity refers to the context in which the theory explains relationships among variables, 
making the explanatory power of theory “conditional” on a specific context. Context specificity 
enhances the application of a theory to new fields of inquiry. Context-sensitivity shows the sensitivity 
of relationships to changes in context (Whetten, 2009). There are theories and core constructs that 
are “paradigmatic” (as opposed to “propositional”), which are accepted lenses among the research 
community because of their recurrent significance in extant applications. The threat and coping 
appraisal constructs of PMT (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983) constitute paradigmatic constructs since 
their saliency has been established in multiple applications in various fields including health and IS 
security. These constructs have demonstrated significant explanatory power in predicting security 
behaviors (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin 2010).  
 
According to PMT and theories that were built on it—most notably the technology threat avoidance 
theory proposed by Liang and Xue (2009)—security tools are avoidance mechanisms that help users 
counter threats. As positive technology stimuli, security tools directly involve users’ cognitive 
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processes of avoiding threats and taking protective actions (Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Liang & Xue, 
2009). PMT has been used in voluntary settings to study users’ decisions on protective behaviors 
(e.g., Anderson & Agarwal 2010; Chen & Zahedi 2009). Hence, PMT constitutes an appropriate core 
theory to investigate users’ online security behaviors.  
 
PMT posits that humans’ protective behaviors involve two cognitive processes—threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal. The principal variables in the threat appraisal process are the perceived 
susceptibility to the threat (a perception about the extent of vulnerability to the threat) and the 
perceived severity of the threat (a perception about the magnitude of possible harm if no 
countermeasures are taken). The primary constructs in the coping appraisal process are response 
efficacy (a belief in the effectiveness of the countermeasure) and coping self-efficacy (a belief in one’s 
own ability to deal with the threat with countermeasures) (Rogers, 1975; Rogers, 1983).  
 
We extend PMT by contextualizing it to fake-website threats and using detection tools to counter 
them. This “specific” context adds several core constructs (X in XY) as antecedents of PMT’s threat 
and coping appraisals. This specificity involves benefit and cost of detection tools, which provide an 
opportunity to alter perceptions of threat and coping as well as consequent outcomes by manipulating 
detection tools’ features. Another addition to context specificity in our theory is the extension of the 
behavior outcomes to include reliance on detection tools in decisions to visit and interact with 
websites and users’ self-protection performance, which make the right side (Y in XY) context-
specific. Context-specific X and Y are called Level 1 contextualization (Hong et al., 2014).  
 
The Level 2 extension of a theory involves investigating how “sensitive” the specific theory is with 
respect to “where” it is implemented (Whetten, 2009, Hong et al., 2014). In fake-website threats, 
context-sensitivity could be explored from multiple perspectives, the more immediate of which are 
threat and domain types. Fake-website detection tools could embody algorithms specially designed 
for particular threat types and domains (type of websites with different products and services). From 
users’ points of view, threat type and domain type could influence their perceptions and behaviors. 
Therefore, our Level 2 extension of PMT is to investigate the “context sensitivity” of our theory with 
respect to threat and domain types. 
2.1. Contextualization of Outcomes 
PMT proposes that, when individuals appraise the threat by assessing the susceptibility to and 
severity of the threat and are confident in their coping ability (in terms of response efficacy and self-
efficacy), they tend to take protective actions in terms of single or multiple actions (Rippetoe & Roger, 
1987) or may adopt maladaptive behaviors, such as avoidance or wishful thinking (Milne, Sheeran, & 
Orbell, 2000). In the IS studies that apply and extend PMT, the outcome of threat and coping 
appraisals has been conceptualized as behavioral intent (Johnson & Warkentin, 2010) and avoidance 
and emotion-focused coping (Liang & Xue, 2009).  
 
In contextualizing PMT specific to fake-website threats and detector tools to counter them, we argue 
that there are two types of outcomes: reliance on a tool in dealing with fake-website threats and the 
success of individuals in self-protection. Individuals access the Web regularly, and in each access 
they need to decide whether or not the website is fake. They may rely to a varying degree on the 
detector in making this decision. Furthermore, the ultimate criterion for judging a detector’s 
performance and users’ behaviors is the extent of users’ success in self-protection in the repeated 
use of the detector. Therefore, user reliance and performance constitute the contextualization of the 
outcome variables in the DTI theory.  
2.2. Contextualization of Detector Benefit and Cost 
To identify the salient elements for benefit and cost analysis of fake-website detection tools and 
understand user reactions to such tools, we need to look into users’ cognitive process of detecting 
deceptions when such tools are in place. According to the competence model of fraud detection 
(Johnson, Grazioli, Jamal, & Berryman, 2001), a deception involves two parties with conflicting 
interests, a deceiver and a target. The deceiver uses deceptive tactics to manipulate and 
misrepresent cues of a situation that depart from the truth to induce a misjudgment by the target. The 
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target, therefore, will behave in accordance with the deceiver’s manipulations and misrepresentations 
(Johnson et al., 2001). To successfully detect deceptions, individuals need to detect the 
inconsistencies between the cues manipulated and the truth. Thus, fake-website detection tools need 
to enhance avoidance behavior by improving users’ propensity to notice and attribute deception (Xiao 
& Benbasat, 2011). More specifically, effective fake-website detection tools need to facilitate 
individuals’ cognitive process in arousing suspicion(s) about abnormalities (inconsistencies between 
the cues manipulated and the truth), generating and evaluating hypotheses on the situation, and 
reaching a conclusion about whether there is a deception (Johnson et al., 2001). In fake-website 
detection, two broad categories of tool elements can facilitate such cognitive process: (1) 
performance (benefit) and cost elements and (2) user interface elements. Performance and cost 
elements play a critical role in activating users’ fraud detection cognitive process before they fall into 
the deceiver’s manipulations; user interface elements communicate the tool’s findings and help users 
detect manipulated and misrepresented cues and heed the tool’s warnings.  
 
This paper is part of a larger federally funded research project that investigates both the performance 
(benefit)/cost and user-interface elements of fake-website detection tools. In this paper, we report on 
the first category of elements. Table 1 summarizes a selective set of studies relevant to our study. As 
we elaborate below, based on the literature, we have identified salient performance-related elements 
for fake-website detection tools as detector’ accuracy and runtime speed, which constitute the 
benefits that users will derive from using such tools. However, no tool is perfect. Tools’ errors could 
cost users in terms of financial damage or efforts to mitigate consequences of such errors; hence, 
perceived cost of error is a salient element. 
 
Table 1. Contextualization of Fake-Website Threats and Detection Tools 
Study Method Study objective Performance metrics Findings 
Benefit: performance: accuracy and runtime speed 
Abbasi et al. 
(2010) 
 
Experiment 
Improving detection 
accuracy for fake 
website detection 
Overall accuracy, 
class-level 
precision, & class-
level recall 
AZProtect using SLT-based 
algorithm is more accurate in 
detecting both spoofed and 
concocted fake websites 
Bliss, Gilson, 
& Deaton 
(1995) 
Experiment 
Investigating the match 
between (i) warning 
reliability and (ii) users’ 
response frequency, 
speed, and accuracy 
Warning reliability, 
response 
frequency, speed 
& accuracy 
90% of the subjects’ 
response frequency to the 
warnings matched the 
warning reliability 
Jonsson, 
Harris, & 
Nass (2008) 
Experiment 
Studying impacts of 
accuracy of an in-car 
hazard warning 
system on driving 
performance 
# of collisions & 
offroad accidents, 
obeying traffic 
laws, & perceived 
accuracy 
Decreased accuracy of the 
system negatively impacted 
driving performance and trust 
in the system 
Zhang et al. 
(2007) Experiment 
Comparing the accuracy 
of 10 popular fake 
website detection tools 
Class-level recall 
No single detection 
technique emerged, tools’ 
performance varied 
depending on the data 
sources 
Cost: cost of detector’s error 
Cavusoglu,  
Mishra, & 
Raghunathan 
(2005) 
Mathematic
al modeling 
Studying the 
organizational value of 
using detection 
systems based on a 
cost-benefit model 
Damage caused 
by an undetected 
intrusion, cost of 
manual 
investigation, and 
utility of intrusion 
detection 
Using intrusion detection 
systems had positive values for 
organizations 
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 Table 1. Contextualization of Fake-Website Threats and Detection Tools (cont.) 
Study Method Study objective Performance metrics Findings 
Cost: cost of detector’s error 
Yue and 
Çakanyildirim 
(2007) 
Mathematic
al modeling 
Comparing the 
response cost of 
clearing intrusion 
alarms when using 
reactive vs. proactive 
response strategies 
Response costs 
and damage costs 
An optimal response strategy 
is a mixture of both reactive 
and proactive responses and 
depends on cost and 
investigation rate parameters 
Threat context-sensitivity 
Abbasi et al. 
(2010) 
 
Experiment 
Improving fake-
website detection 
accuracy using 
learning classifiers 
that use more fraud 
cues and threat type 
information 
Performance 
measures 
including overall 
accuracy, class-
level precision, 
and class-level 
recall 
AZProtect using SLT-based 
algorithm is more accurate in 
detecting both spoofed and 
concocted fake websites when 
threat type cues were fed into 
the algorithm 
Abbasi & 
Chen (2009b) Experiment 
Studying impacts of 
threat type-specific 
cues on fake website 
detection performance 
Overall accuracy 
and class level F-
measure, 
precision, and 
recall 
Rich threat type-specific cues 
along with a proper choice of 
algorithms can improve 
detection performance of fake 
escrow websites 
Lau et al. 
(2011) Experiment 
Improving online 
review deception 
detection accuracy by 
incorporating threat-
type-specific 
deception cues 
Class-level 
misclassification 
rates 
Using threat type- specific cues 
can improve detection 
performance of online review 
deception 
Domain context-sensitivity 
Biros, 
George, & 
Zmud (2002) 
Experiment 
Studying how domain 
experience and other 
focal factors impact 
deception detection 
rate, false alarms, and 
task accuracy 
Deception 
detection rate, 
false alarms, and 
task accuracy 
Domain experience was 
positively associated with task 
accuracy 
Grazioli & 
Jarvenpaa 
(2003) 
Content 
analysis 
Investigating the 
deceptive tactics used 
by deceivers on the 
Internet in different 
domains 
Distributions of 
deception tactics 
used in three 
domains: b2b, 
b2c, and c2c 
Different types of deceivers 
used different deceptive tactics 
in different domains. 
Johnson et al. 
(2001) 
Field 
experiment 
Studying impacts of 
involving cognitive 
processes to 
successfully evaluate 
domain-specific 
deceptive tactics 
Domain-specific 
deceptive tactics 
and cues, & 
detection errors 
Employing the proposed 
heuristics model (based on the 
competence model of fraud 
detection) successfully 
detected frauds in the cases. 
2.2.1. Benefit: Detector’s Accuracy and Speed 
In many cases, security tasks are “secondary” to many users. They want the security task to get done 
as quickly as possible so that they can go back to the primary task (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006). 
Therefore, security decisions are made under time pressure because they distract users from their 
primary task. To help users make fast and accurate security decisions about visiting a website, 
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detection tools should be able to provide timely and accurate detection results. With respect to 
accuracy, the two types of errors associated with alarm systems are failing to detect a fake website 
(alarm failures) and false alarms (Bliss et al., 1995; Edworthy, 1997). It has been reported that existing 
fake-website detection tools suffer from significantly high alarm failures (i.e., low detection rates of fake 
websites) (Zhang et al., 2007; Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). This is quite problematic since the potential 
consequences of alarm failures can be quite devastating in terms of financial loss and identity theft 
(Abbasi et al., 2010). Researchers have endeavored to develop algorithms for detection tools that can 
deliver accurate and timely detection results (Abbasi et al., 2010). Therefore, accuracy and speed of 
detector tools should be among the salient elements impacting users’ security behaviors.  
2.2.2. Cost: Perceived Cost of Detector’s Error 
Detection tools are evaluated based on their benefit and cost. Tools’ benefits stem from their ability to 
detect fake websites, but their costs include the extent of users’ loss caused by the tools’ inability to 
accurately detect the threat and the monetary consequences of such errors (Cavusoglu et al., 2005; 
Abbasi et al., 2010). By following a detector’s false negative advice (failing to warn against a fake-website 
attack), users could suffer costly damages such as identity theft (Dinev, 2006). Such failures impact users’ 
cost-benefit evaluation about a threat countermeasure (e.g., a detection tool) (Liang & Xue, 2009). 
Considering that designers of detection tools can incorporate false negative costs (in the detection 
methods) that are congruent with users’ perceptions, a deeper understanding of the impact of error costs 
on user perceptions and behaviors is warranted; hence, cost of detector error is a salient element. 
2.3. Threat Context-Sensitivity: Type of Threat the Detector Can Handle 
Two prevalent types of fake websites that employ contrasting forms of deception (i.e., attack 
strategies) are spoofed and concocted sites. These varying types of deception have important 
implications for detecting fake websites (Xiao & Benbasat, 2011). Spoofed sites mimic well-known 
existing websites. The purpose of these sites is online identity theft (Abbasi et al., 2010). Concocted 
sites are deceptive websites attempting to appear as unique, legitimate online entities with the 
objective of failure-to-ship fraud (Chua & Wareham, 2004; Abbasi et al., 2010). Currently, concocted 
sites are becoming increasingly common, with thousands of new examples appearing daily on the 
Internet (Airoldi & Malin, 2004; Greenberg, 2008). The two types of fake websites use different 
deceptive tactics for successfully defrauding Internet users (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa, 2003). 
Consequently, users may behave differently when using detection tools in the context of spoofed 
websites as compared to concocted websites. For instance, users often discount tool 
recommendations when encountering spoofed websites that “appear familiar” (Wu et al., 2006). 
Moreover, these two types have important implications for the design of fake-website detection tools. 
Prior studies have noted that, due to the differences in the fraud tactics, many existing tools focus on 
detecting only a single category and so provide limited support across both spoofed and concocted 
sites (Abbasi et al., 2010). This limitation, coupled with the potential for variation in user behavior 
when encountering spoofed and concocted websites, underscores the significance of including the 
threat type as a salient element impacting users’ behaviors.  
2.4. Domain Context-Sensitivity: Type of Domain the Detector Can Handle 
Prior studies have demonstrated the influences of domain of use on Internet users’ behaviors. 
Internet users’ decision to disclose private information depends on the website domains (Bansal, 
Zahedi, & Gefen, 2008). In highly sensitive domains such as health and finance, users could show 
“visceral feelings” about their private information and be reluctant to disclose (Angst & Agarwal, 2009, 
p. 359). However, this might not be the case in relatively insensitive domains such as online news. 
Meanwhile, even in highly sensitive domains such as online pharmacies or online banks, users might 
have different threat and deception awareness based on their personal experiences and domain 
knowledge (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). For instance, fake online pharmacies are highly successful due 
to Internet users’ general lack of awareness about medical content pertaining to FDA regulations, 
warnings regarding adverse drug reactions, and the prevalence of rogue Internet pharmacies 
(Greenberg, 2008; White & Horvitz, 2009; Abbasi et al. 2012). Therefore, it is essential to study the 
role of detection tools for the domains in which users have greater security concerns.  
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3. Model Conceptualization and Hypothesis Development  
Based on the DTI theory, we propose our conceptualized detection tool impact (DTI) model (See 
Figure 1). Table 2 summarizes the constructs’ definitions. The model is a user-centric assessment of 
how salient elements of the detection tool could change users’ reliance on the tool and their self-
protection performance.  
 
According to PMT, individuals first appraise a threat (threat appraisal) and then assess ways to cope 
with it (coping appraisal) (Liang & Xue, 2009).  Coping appraisal includes individuals’ assessment of 
their own abilities (self-efficacy) and the efficacy of response to the threat (response efficacy). During 
the coping appraisal, individuals form their perceptions about the effectiveness of the 
countermeasures and then consider personal effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 1. Detection Tool Impact (DTI) Model 
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Table 2. Construct Definition and Source of Scale Development 
Constructs Definitions Major references 
Detector 
response efficacy 
Users’ belief about the effectiveness of 
the tool in detecting fake websites 
Liang & Xue (2009), Johnston & 
Warkentin (2010), Rogers (1975), Witte, 
Cameron, McKeon, & Berkowitz (1996) 
Cost of detector 
error 
Users’ perceptions regarding the financial 
loss caused by the detector errors 
Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman 
(2002), Virta, Jacobson, & Kobza (2003) 
Coping self-
efficacy 
Users’ beliefs of their own ability of taking 
security countermeasures to deal with 
fake website threats 
Bandura (1982), Rogers (1975), Witte et 
al. (1996) 
Perceived threat 
severity 
Users’ beliefs about the magnitude of the 
potential harm caused by visiting fake 
websites 
Johnston & Warkentin (2010), Liang and 
Xue 2009; Rogers 1975; Witte et al. 
1996 
Perceived threat 
susceptibility 
Users’ beliefs about their personal 
possibility of encountering and/or visiting 
fake websites 
Johnston & Warkentin (2010), Liang & 
Xue (2009), Rogers (1975), Witte et al. 
(1996) 
Reported reliance 
on the detector 
Users’ decision to follow the 
recommendation of the detector in 
making decisions regarding visiting or 
transacting with a website 
Davis (1989), Straub, Limayem, & 
Karahanna (1995), Venkatesh, Morris, 
Davis, & Davis (2003) 
Actual 
performance 
Users’ actual success in identifying and 
avoiding fake website attacks 
Wu et al. (2006), Dhamija et al. (2006), 
Adipat, Zhang, & Zhou (2011) 
 
Applications of PMT have shown that threat appraisal and coping appraisal are two cognitive 
mediating processes in individuals’ protective behaviors in health contexts (Rippetoe & Rogers, 
1987). In contextualizing PMT, the DTI theory argues that, in coping appraisal for dealing with fake 
website threats, users need to rely on the efficacy of both detection tools and their own coping 
abilities in dealing with the threat.  
 
Per the DTI theory, the detector’s performance elements are accuracy and speed, which benefit its 
users. A tool’s response efficacy is an important component of coping appraisal because an effective 
tool that can identify and prevent fake-website attacks gives users peace of mind when visiting the 
Web. A protective IT artifact’s ability to accurately detect threats impacts users’ perceptions of the 
artifact (Sunshine et al., 2009). In the context of fake websites, less accurate detectors have been 
associated with lower perceived response efficacy (Li & Helenius, 2007; Abbasi et al., 2010). 
“Warning fatigue”, “crying wolf”, and “alarm failure” are all examples of observed low perceived 
response efficacy effects attributable to poor detector accuracy (Bliss et al., 1995; Egelman, Cranor, 
& Hong, 2008; Sunshine et al., 2009; Akhawe & Felt, 2013). Conversely, other studies have shown 
that higher detector accuracy can improve perceived detector response efficacy (Wu et al., 2006; 
Herzberg & Jbara, 2008). Thus, 
 
H1: Detector’s accuracy is positively associated with users’ perceived detector response 
efficacy.  
 
Self-efficacy is defined as beliefs about “one’s capability to organize and execute the course of action 
required to produce attainment” (Bandura, 1997, p. 3). Self-efficacy has been shown to promote 
various behaviors (Bandura, 1982; Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977) and appears in PMT as a part of 
coping appraisal. Due to the limitation of resources available for an action (such as paying attention to 
the advice of a detector while engaged in a primary task), a cost-benefit evaluation of taking the 
action could also improve or diminish self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982; Bandura et al., 1977; Marks & 
Allegrante, 2005; Strecher, DeVellis, Becker, & Rosenstock, 1986). Performance achievement is one 
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of the major sources of self-efficacy. Success gives people a sense of mastering the situation 
(Bandura et al., 1977). The literature in health-related behaviors shows that individuals’ self-efficacy 
could be enhanced through deliberate manipulations, which subsequently lead to behavior 
improvements in areas such as smoking cessation, weight control and alcohol abuse (see Strecher et 
al. (1986) for a review). Furthermore, Compeau and Higgins (1995) have shown that individuals’ 
computer self-efficacy can be improved by others’ encouragement, use, and support. Similarly, Lam 
and Lee (2006) have shown that others’ encouragement and support influence internet self-efficacy 
for older adults. Extending these arguments to detection tools, we argue that the accuracy of the tool 
influences users’ coping self-efficacy since a more accurate tool provides users a stronger sense of 
ability to cope with online threats. Thus, 
 
H2: Detector’s accuracy is positively associated with users’ coping self-efficacy.  
 
Prior studies have recognized the importance of detector run-time on user perceptions of the tool 
(Xiang, Hong, Rose, & Cranor, 2011). Simply put, faster tools have been considered superior 
performers (Chou, Ledesma, Teraguchi, Boneh, & Mitchell, 2004). Run-time speed has been one of 
the major metrics for measuring the performance of detection tools mostly due to the secondary 
nature of fake-website detection in real-time user environments (Abbasi et al., 2010). When the 
detector has a long process time, it could interfere with individuals’ primary purpose for visiting 
websites, costing them time and focus while waiting for the detector to run and return its results 
(Dhamija et al., 2006). As Kumaraguru et al. (2010) note, “one does not go to an online banking Web 
site to check the SSL implementation of the Web site, but rather to perform a banking transaction” (p. 
2). Consequently, in real-time detection environments with users constantly awaiting tool 
recommendations, fast run-time speed is “crucial” for maintaining favorable user perceptions of tool 
performance (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b, p. 100). Hence, 
 
H3: Detector’s run-time speed is positively associated with users’ perceived response 
efficacy.  
 
Humans strive to have control over their environments. Self-efficacy enables them to exercise 
personal control (Bandura, 1997). Control over time has been shown to play a major role in workers’ 
stress, satisfaction, and performance in organizational studies (Macan, 1994), which has led to the 
concept of “time congruity” (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 2003). Time congruity is the agreement 
between individuals’ style of using time with the time demand under which they work. Studies have 
shown that interruptions (such as those caused by supervisors) lead to the perception of poor time 
control (Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 2003; Chen, Zhang, Leung, & Zhou, 2010). Applying these 
findings to the context of fake-website detectors, we argue that the run time of the detector is an 
interruption that can reduce individuals’ time congruity in performing their primary tasks of web 
access and use. A detector’s fast runtime reduces the extent of this interruption and, hence, 
preserves individuals’ time congruity and promotes a sense of control over their environment, which, 
in turn, positively influences their coping self-efficacy. Thus, 
 
H4: Detector’s speed is positively associated with users’ perceived coping self-efficacy. 
 
The PMT assumes that people indeed assess expected benefits and costs and that this assessment 
plays a role in their threat appraisal (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; Weinstein, 1988). Cost includes the 
“effort in carrying out a precaution, the expense, any undesirable side effects” (Weinstein, 1988, p. 
365). In the DTI theory, one side effect of using the detector is the perceived cost of its error. Hence, 
we argue that the assessment of cost due to detector error is a part of the cost-benefit analysis, which 
initiates threat and coping appraisals because people tend to first make more general cost 
assessments of a protective action and then move to more personally related assessments such as 
whether they are exposed to a given threat in terms of the severity of and susceptibility to the threat 
(Weinstein, 1988).  
 
The cost of detection error is damaging to those who follow the system’s incorrect recommendations 
(Cavusoglu et al., 2005). Models for detecting security threats have often leveraged perceived 
misclassification costs, which are closely aligned with perceived threat severity (Lee, Fan, Miller, 
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Stolfo, & Zadok, 2002). For instance, in the context of intrusion detection systems (Lee et al., 2002; p. 
6), the perceived cost of detection error is related to the perceived “cost of damage caused by an 
intrusion.” Similarly, perceptions about costs of a failure to detect a phishing email are related to the 
perceived severity of the attack (Abu-Nimeh, Nappa, Wang, & Nair, 2007). Consequently, users’ 
perceived costs associated with detection errors impact their perceptions about the severity of the 
threat. Hence, 
 
H5: Perceived cost of detector error is positively associated with users’ perceived threat 
severity.  
 
Research has found that automatic tools’ errors can impact users’ perceptions of the tools’ 
creditability and capability and the users’ consequent behaviors (Rice, 2009). According to PMT, an 
assessment of expected costs when taking the recommended countermeasure plays an influential 
role in users’ cognitive processes of making decisions about the threat (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987; 
Weinstein, 1988). In the specific context of fake-website detention tools, the DTI theory posits that 
cost of detector error triggers users to reassess their vulnerability to fake website threats. Higher 
perceived costs reduce users’ beliefs that the protective tool will safeguard them (Liang & Xue, 2009, 
2010). The uncertainty caused by perceived cost of error adds to the perceived likelihood of threat 
and increases users’ anxiety about their threat exposure because they have to contend with two 
sources of threat: fake-website threat and threat of costly error. Thus, perceived cost of error can 
compound users’ sense of being vulnerable and defenseless against attack. 
 
H6: Perceived cost of detector error is positively associated with users’ perceived threat 
susceptibility.  
 
One of the two dependent variables in this study is the extent of reliance on the tool as reported by 
users. While intention to use IT artifacts has been a commonly used dependent variable in studying 
users’ behaviors and IT adoption, for security tools, actual use is the gold standard. Taking precaution 
against a threat is a decision and has a dynamic process (Weinstein, 1988). Expressing intention 
does not necessarily capture the decision in the hazard condition when an individual actually comes 
face to face with a specific threat because “many people who claim to be convinced that a precaution 
is worthwhile, admit that they have yet to carry through on their intentions” (Weinstein, 1988, p. 374). 
Weinstein (1988) gives an example of individuals who intend to stop smoking but never carry out the 
intention until coming face to face with the specific threat of lung cancer. Contextualizing this 
argument for using the detector as a precaution, we argue that the actual reliance on a detection tool 
in a specific condition of threat is a more salient measure of actual use. Hence, reported reliance in 
this study refers to the individual’s decision to follow the recommendation of the tool in making 
decisions regarding visiting or transacting with a website.  
 
In PMT, the threat appraisal (threat susceptibility and severity) as well as coping mechanism (coping 
self-efficacy and response efficacy) are behavior antecedents. In the DTI theory, these core 
constructs impact the context-specific outcomes—users’ reliance on the detector, which, in turn, 
influences users’ self-protection performance. Hence, we posit that threat appraisal and coping 
appraisal influence users’ reliance on the detector. Detector response efficacy represents users’ 
beliefs that the tool is effective and accurate. As a coping mechanism, an effective tool should 
encourage more use. In design science it has been observed that “users should have accurate beliefs 
about the reliability of automation” (Parasuraman & Miller, 2004, p. 52). In the IS field, numerous 
studies have demonstrated that a reliable tool is an important antecedent for use and intention to use 
the IT artifact (e.g., McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002; Vance, Elie-Dit-Cosaque, & Straub, 
2008; Zahedi & Song, 2008). In the context of online security, one can argue response efficacy is a 
salient measure of the reliability of a detection tool. Specifically in the context of fake websites, 
perceived detector response efficacy has been theorized as a likely predictor of tool reliance (Cranor 
2008). Users with low perceived detector response efficacy may choose to ignore or disregard tool 
warnings (Egelman et al., 2008). A recent large-scale fake-website detection study suggests that 
users’ reliance on detection tool warnings can vary by between 40% and 60% purely based on their 
perceived detector response efficacy (Akhawe & Felt, 2013). Hence, 
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H7: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with 
perceived detector response efficacy.  
 
Self-efficacy is “the strength of convictions” in one’s own ability, which determines whether “coping 
behavior will be attempted” (Bandura, 1982; Bandura et al., 1977, p. 126). Numerous studies have 
shown that self-efficacy in taking protective actions to deal with a threat is an antecedent of 
behavioral change (e.g., Rippetoe & Rogers 1987; Witte et al., 1996) and a major determinant of 
security-related behaviors (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010; Liang & Xue, 2009). Specifically in the context on security warnings, self-efficacy has also been 
theorized as having a positive relation with security tool reliance (Cranor, 2008). Thus, 
 
H8: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with 
their perceived self-efficacy.  
 
It is observed that people will not take protective actions against a threat unless they feel vulnerable 
(Weinstein, 1988; Witte et al., 1996). Therefore, we should expect that higher levels of threat 
susceptibility and severity should prompt individuals to rely more on the detector’s recommendation 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2009). 
The influence of threat severity on reliance stems from the argument that, as the magnitude of harm 
caused by visiting fake websites increases, users are more likely to seek to protect themselves by 
relying on the detector. There is evidence in the fake-website detection literature to support this 
argument. Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor (2007) observed that, when encountering fake websites, 
users with higher perceived threat severity for having their information stolen were more likely to take 
protective actions. Egelman et al. (2008) performed a qualitative analysis of users that relied heavily 
on fake-website detectors and found one of the most common user-reported reasons to be high 
perceived threat severity, with responses such as: (1) “didn’t want to get burned”, (2) “don’t like to 
gamble with the little money I have”, and (3) “better to be safe than sorry”. In general, when 
encountering a potential fake-website, users’ perceptions of the threat, and the resulting judgments, 
are critical pre-requisite considerations to any protective behavior such as detector reliance (Camp, 
2009; Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs, & Komanduri, 2011). Hence, 
 
H9: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with 
perceived threat severity.  
 
Threat susceptibility is another component of threat appraisal. People normally do not pay attention to 
adverse events that they perceive as rare or unlikely to impact them (Rogers, 1975). Similarly, “if an 
IT threat is perceived to have no chance of occurring, there should be no interest in acting against it” 
(Liang & Xue, 2009, p. 81). Perceived vulnerability to fake-website attacks is considered an important 
variable impacting users’ likelihood of taking protective actions (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). 
When using security tools to protect against fake-websites, low perceived threat susceptibility has 
been observed as a major cause for ignoring or disregarding tool warnings (Wu et al., 2006). Users 
have to feel vulnerable to a fake-website threat in order to pay attention to the detector’s warnings 
and follow its advice. Thus, 
 
H10: The extent of users’ reported reliance on the detector is positively associated with 
perceived threat susceptibility.  
 
In the literature of security research, the users’ performance when using a protection tool is rarely 
assessed. Some studies have developed models to assess system performance when using 
protective resources (Basagiannis, Katsaros, Pombortsis, & Alexiou, 2009). It also has been reported 
that not using tools that prevent security attacks resulted in spoof rates as high as 30-45 percent (Wu 
et al., 2006). However, to our knowledge, there has not been any study on developing conceptual 
models for assessing individual security performance when using detection tools. We address this 
gap by including users’ performance assessment as the second dependent variable in our model. We 
argue that security performance enhancement is the ultimate goal of developing any security tool. 
People generally are poor at detecting deceptions; relying on tools could help improve their detection 
rates (Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). Thus, using the detection tool in making 
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decisions about visiting a website or transacting with the website should improve users’ performance 
in avoiding the fake-website security threats. Hence, 
 
H11: Users’ actual performance in avoiding fake websites is positively associated with 
the extent of reported reliance on the detector.  
3.1. Context-Sensitivity of Domain and Threat Types 
Whetten (2009) distinguishes between “specificity” and “sensitivity” of context in theory building (p. 
29). In our case, while the DTI theory is “specific” to online security threats and the role of detection 
tools in preventing them, its “sensitivity” should be tested within different types of domains in which 
people feel threatened and may rely on the detector to prevent security threats. People use the Web 
for different purposes and tasks, some of which are more sensitive and critical than others. 
Consequently, Internet users’ security-related perceptions and behaviors may vary depending on web 
domains (Angst & Agarwal, 2009; Bansal et al., 2008). In our case, due to differences in the nature 
and impacts of website frauds in online banks and pharmacies (Armin, 2010, Easton, 2007; Lennon, 
2011), users may be more sensitive to online banks than online pharmacies since they may suffer 
immediate financial loss from fake online banks.  
 
Following Johns (2006), we define domain type as “situational opportunities and constraints” that 
could influence individuals’ security behaviors and “functional relationships between variables” (p. 
386). Domain type establishes the “when” aspect of theory building—one of the omnibus dimensions 
of context identified by Johns (2006), and constitutes the condition under which strengths of 
relationships in DTI theory are examined. Per Whetten (2009), the DTI theory is a “conditional” 
explanation in that use domain could modify the benefit and cost impact of the detector and users’ 
eventual reliance on it. Whetten (2009) argues that, if a variable (Z) measuring context-sensitivity 
impacts X (in XY), then it should be conceptualized as a moderator, whereas if Z impacts only Y, 
then it should be used as a control variable.  
 
We use two variables to study the context-sensitivity of our theory: domain type and threat type. 
People use the Internet in different domains for different purposes. A sensitive domain involves the 
exchange of people’s sensitive private information. Security attacks in such domains could pose 
serious monetary or personal damages. We posit that people’s perceptions and behaviors are 
affected by the sensitivity of the domain. Therefore, domain should moderate the paths in the model. 
In accessing a sensitive website, users tend to have a high degree of awareness about the type of 
website domain.  Research has shown that when users access websites in sensitive domains, they 
feel more vulnerable (SAP, 2013). We argue that users’ acute awareness of domain type influences 
their expectation of detection tools’ benefits and costs. For example, users who have online bank 
accounts are far more aware of the fake-website threats to their finance, and, hence, expect a higher 
level of performance from detection tools in order to use them. Hence, we investigate context-
sensitivity of domain type as a moderator of the DTI paths. 
 
We explore this moderation through concentrating on two important domains: online pharmacies and 
online banks. We selected these domains since health- and money-related activities are both 
sensitive domains with significant online activity and prevalence of fake website-based fraud. Internet 
fraud often occurs as a result of unsuspecting Internet users providing personal information to fake 
websites in exchange for fictitious products and/or services (Chua & Wareham, 2004; Abbasi et al., 
2010, 2012). Financial institution websites are among the most common domains for fake website 
attacks (Ramzan & Wuest, 2007). For instance, fake online banks are highly successful at luring 
victims using the ruse of offering attractive escrow services, bank accounts, currency exchange, small 
business loans, philanthropic ventures, and so on (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b). Similarly, fraudulent 
online pharmacies are highly pervasive. According to studies conducted by the World Health 
Organization and U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 11,000 of the 12,000 online pharmacies 
examined were websites engaging in a variety of fraudulent activities, including failure-to-ship, identity 
theft, and sale of counterfeit products; and the number of people visiting such websites continues to 
increase dramatically (Krebs, 2005; Easton, 2007; Greenberg, 2008).  
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In the case of online banks, the financial loss due to fake-website attacks is more immediate and 
impactful. Cash thefts from individual accounts could be discovered faster and are more visible, 
whereas, in the case of online pharmacies, there are a variety of impacts such as non-delivery, 
identity theft, and exposure to fake drugs, which are less visible and could take longer to discover. 
 
Therefore, depending on the immediacy and consequences of attacks, individuals may have different 
appraisals of threats and their coping capabilities. The way individuals behave in one type of domain 
may not necessarily be the same as their behavior in a different domain type. Therefore, domain type 
could moderate the impacts the detector’s cost and benefit on individuals’ appraisals of threats and 
coping efficacy as well as the paths leading to their reliance on the detector. The moderating 
influence of domain type on the model paths is exploratory at this point since the conditional 
manifestations of such moderation are yet to be explored. 
  
H12: Domain type, online banks vs. online pharmacies, moderates the DTI paths. 
 
When it comes to threat type, users have little knowledge of threat types and the ways fake websites 
could deceive them. Therefore, users’ expectations of benefit and cost of detection tools or their 
perceived threat and coping appraisals could not be influenced by threat type. However, detection 
tools’ success in dealing with the two threat types may differ. The variance in detection performance 
influences users’ self-protection success; thus, threat type impacts Y only. Following Whetten’s 
(2009) argument, we use threat type as a control variable that impacts users actual performance. 
3.2. User Profiles as Control Variables 
In a user-centered design approach, identifying and understanding user profile variables and 
individual differences that play a role in users’ perceptions and behaviors regarding system design 
features are critical to the successful design of personalized systems (Kramer, Noronha, & Vergo, 
2000). In the IS behavior literature as well as the PMT literature, demographic variables, including 
age, gender, and education are included as profile variables (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2003). Age has 
been shown to be a salient factor in the application of PMT (Sturges & Rogers, 1996). Experience-
related individual differences, including past encounters with fake websites and familiarity with the 
domain and websites, are also part of user profiles (Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2010; Chen & Zahedi, 
2009; Zahedi & Song, 2008). Security habit, defined as users’ routine security behaviors without 
conscious intention, is an influencing factor impacting users’ security perceptions and behaviors 
(Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006). In Weinstein’s (1988) study, survey respondents reported “not habitual” 
as the one of the main reasons for not carrying out precaution intentions. Habit contributes to the 
sense of coping self-efficacy. We therefore included security habit as a control variable in users’ 
profiles. Moreover, the literature on threat perception indicates that threat awareness plays a 
significant role in security behavior (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998) and is associated with 
the perception of susceptibility to a threat (Smerecnik, Mesters, de Vries, & de Vries, 2009). We have 
included the awareness as a control associated with susceptibility. 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Experimental Design and Protocol 
The research methodology was controlled lab experiment. We chose this methodology in order to 
examine the actual behaviors of individuals in using the detector. The experimental design was a 2 x 
2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 32 full-factorial design: tool’s accuracy, tool’s runtime speed, loss due to tool’s error, 
domain type, and threat type. Each factor had two levels. The detection tool’s accuracy was high vs. 
low (90% vs. 60%), the runtime was fast vs. slow (1 vs. 4 seconds), the loss due to the detection error 
was high vs. low ($10 vs. $1), the domain types were online pharmacies vs. online banks, and the 
type of threat was either spoofed or concocted. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the 32 
settings.  
 
We chose the accuracy rates based on recent benchmarking studies reporting that the accuracies for 
commonly used state-of-the-art anti-phishing tools range from approximately 60 percent to 90 percent 
(Abbasi et al., 2010). This range encompasses the tools employed by the Internet Explorer and 
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Firefox web browsers, which collectively account for nearly 80 percent of the browser market share 
(Vaughan-Nichols, 2011). Since these commonly used tools have negligible false alarm rates (Abbasi 
& Chen, 2009a), the errors associated with the 60 percent and 90 percent accurate detectors were 
primarily alarm failures (i.e., failing to detect a fake website). We chose the times (1 and 4 seconds) 
based on existing anti-phishing tools that have run times ranging from just under 1 second to slightly 
over 3 seconds (Chou et al., 2004; Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). Median losses attributable to fake 
websites range from approximately $300 for those suffering only direct monetary losses to $3,000 for 
those that are also victims of identity theft, with the latter number including remediation and reputation 
costs (Lennon, 2011; McAfee, 2011b). To operationalize these two possible costs (i.e., low: $300 and 
high: $3000), we provided subjects with a virtual cash box of $100 and a damage cost (per error) of 
either $1 or $10. Subjects could incur total losses up to $200, resulting in a final cash box balance 
between -$100 and $100. Such a range of cash box values, which included the possibility of negative 
balances, was adopted since losses attributable to fake websites can often extend beyond the 
victims’ current means (Lennon, 2011; McAfee, 2011b).  
 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were made aware of their remaining cash box balance. These 
cash box and cost values allowed the proportions of low to high costs and between costs and median 
U.S. household income to be preserved while using numbers that were easier for the subjects to 
understand. The threat type was not part of the manipulation. Per the theoretical discussion, the 
threat type was included as a control variable to examine whether behaviors in response to the tool’s 
salient elements varied based on the type of threat (spoofed vs. concocted).  
 
We conducted the experiment in two domain types: online pharmacies and online banks. An 
inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted, and 15 legitimate online pharmacies was identified—a total of 
45 online pharmacies. The URLs for the legitimate, concocted, and spoofed pharmacy websites were 
obtained from reputable sources including the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy 
(www.nabp.net), LegitScript (www.legitscript.com), and PhishTank (www.phishtank.com). The web 
pages associated with each website URL were collected using a spidering program that preserved 
the original link structure, content, and images. An inventory of 15 spoofed, 15 concocted, and 15 
legitimate online banks was also created—a total of 45 websites. The URLs for the legitimate, 
spoofed, and concocted online banks were obtained from reputable sources including Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), (www.fdic.gov), PhishTank (www.phishtank.com), Artists 
Against 4-1-9 (http://wiki.aa419.org) and Escrow Fraud Prevention (http://escrow-fraud.com/).  
 
To balance subjects’ familiarity with legitimate websites and avoid the company-size bias, the 
legitimate online pharmacies and online banks had an equal number of large, medium and small 
companies. Size was determined based on sales revenue for pharmacies and total dollar amount of 
deposits for banks. In other words, legitimate websites included approximately five from the top 10-
20, another five from the middle, and five smaller companies. 
 
Data for the two domains was collected in two rounds of data collection since the experiment included 
domain-specific tasks and utilized surveys that had domain-specific questions (such as familiarity with 
websites). Combining the two domains could create confusion in training the subjects prior to the 
experiment. We made sure that there was no overlap between subjects participating in the two 
rounds of data collection. 
 
The entire experimental process was developed from scratch in an integrated environment using Java 
programming language. The experimental stimulus was developed from scratch using Java 
programming to simulate different conditions of fake website attacks and different tool settings in terms 
of accuracy, speed, cost of error, domain, and threat type. Figure 4 shows an example of the detection 
interface. Note that, in each case, the URL was shown to the user but is masked in this figure. 
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Figure 2. An Example of the Detection Interface (the URL is Masked) 
 
For the online-pharmacies domain, the performance of fake-website detector was based on one of 
the 16 possible designs. The designs were randomly assigned to the participants. Prior to the start of 
the experiment, the participants were trained about the domains, the sequence of the experiment and 
the detection process.  
 
The participants were randomly assigned to 10 websites (5 legitimate and 5 fake—either spoofed or 
concocted). The experimental task was to buy an over-the-counter drug with a value of about $30 
(Rogaine, a hair regrowth product), for grandpa. This product was chosen because it is an over-the-
counter product with which people are familiar (or could quickly be made familiar), and its counterfeits 
are commonly sold by fake online pharmacies at a lower price. For each website, after being exposed 
to the tool’s recommendation, participants had to decide if they would visit the website, and once on 
the website, the participants had to decide if they would explore the website to find the product and, 
once found, if they would buy the product.  
 
For the online-banks domain, the experimental task was to open a saving account. This is a relevant 
and basic function available on most online banks. Providing personal and financial information to a 
fake website poses great risk of financial loss and identity theft. Accordingly, for each assigned bank 
website, the participants had to make three decisions: whether the website was real or fake, whether 
the website allowed one to open a saving account (if they visited), and whether they would open a 
saving account with this online bank (if it allowed one to open a saving account online). 
 
The experimental protocol was intended to mimic real conditions of use with respect to time limitation 
and possible loss. The participants had 20 minutes to make all their decisions regarding their 10 
assigned websites. This time constraint was chosen after pre-testing and pilot testing in order to 
mimic the time limitation for making decisions and to ensure that the allotted time was reasonable for 
making threat assessment.  
 
Visiting and transacting with phishing websites have costly consequences, such as failure-to-ship 
fraud, identity theft, and exposure to viruses and malware (Dinev, 2006). Incentives or disincentives 
are also important in motivating people to take the proper security precautions (Cranor, 2008). 
Therefore, participants were informed in advance that they would be awarded based on their 
performance. Participants’ performances were scored objectively based on their 20 decisions 
regarding their assigned websites: (1) ability to differentiate 10 legitimate websites from fakes 
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(Dhamija et al., 2006; Wu et al., 2006), (2) decision to visit or avoid 5 fake websites, and (3) 
willingness to transact with 5 fake websites (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa 2000). Each participant’s actual 
performance score was computed as the percentage of correct decisions. 
 
Participants were rewarded based on their performance scores either in cash (gift card) or course 
credits (per each participant’s expressed preference). Cash payment involved $10 for participation 
plus up to an additional $20 based on the subject's decision performance. The extra credit involved 
0.5% extra credit plus up to 1% additional extra credit based on the subject’s decision performance. 
The additional amount of cash or extra credit earned was directly proportional to the participants’ 
actual performance. Of 865 participants, 701 (81%) chose extra credit and 164 (19%) chose cash 
payment. We carried out a t-test for the mean difference between the performance scores of subjects 
based on the two types of incentives. The t-test was not statistically significant. Therefore, the data 
from both groups were combined and used in the analysis.  
 
The protocol involved three stages. In Stage 1, prior to the experiment, the participants answered 
questions regarding their past experience, their profiles, and other pre-experiment questions. Stage 2 
involved the experiment during which data on participants’ actions and decisions were collected. At 
Stage 3, after the completion of the experiment, the participants continued with the online survey to 
answer manipulation check questions, their familiarity with the domain and with the assigned 
websites in the experiment, and remaining perceptual questions in the instrument. The experiment 
was controlled by an extensive software tool specifically designed and implemented for this study. It 
was written in Java and was administered via the local area network in order to protect the computer 
systems from potential threats caused by visiting the concocted and spoofed websites. The 
experiment lasted about 50 minutes. 
4.2. Scale Development  
Whenever possible, the measurement scales for the constructs in the DTI model were adopted from 
literature and modified for the current study. All items were converted to semantic differential scales 
to ensure content validity and to reduce of the threat of common method variance (Chin, Johnson, & 
Schwarz, 2008; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Lee, 2003). Table 2 reports the construct definitions and 
major sources for scale development, and Appendix A contains the details of the instrument. The 
measurement items for perceived threat susceptibility, perceived threat severity, user perceived 
response efficacy, and perceived self-efficacy in taking countermeasures to deal with fake websites 
were adapted from Witte et al. (1996). The items for reported reliance on the detector were adapted 
from Davis (1989), Straub et al. (1995) and Venkatesh et al. (2003). The items for cost of detector 
error were developed for this study. User perceptions regarding the detector’s accuracy and speed 
were measured by a single item.  
 
All the scales for the profile variables were also adopted from literature and modified for this study. 
The items for the security habit were adapted from Pavlou and Fygenson (2006). The items for past 
encounters with fake websites were adapted from Chen and Zahedi (2009). Gender, age, and 
education were measured by a one-item scale. Familiarity with the domain and familiarity with each 
website were measured by one item developed for this study. As previously alluded to, actual user 
performance was measured objectively by assessing participants’ decisions. 
4.3. Pretest, Pilot Test, and Data Collection 
The experiment protocol and the instrument were pretested and pilot-tested as recommended by the 
literature (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001; Straub, 1989). All the construct items, the experiment 
protocol, and experiment instructions were pretested with two faculty members and two PhD 
students. Based on their feedback, we refined the constructs and clarified the wording of the survey 
instruments and the experiment instructions. A faculty and a PhD student pretested the experiment 
protocol, process, and timing. Pilot tests involved two sets. For the online-pharmacies domain, the 
experiment was pilot tested with 28 participants. For the online-banks domain, there were two rounds 
of pilot tests, involving 6 and 26 participants, respectively. Pilot-test participants were recruited from 
the campus of a Midwestern university. 
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After completing each pilot test, the participants were asked to respond to a set of open-ended 
questions regarding the clarity and timing of the experiment and instructions as well as the questions 
in the survey instrument. The survey instrument, experiment procedure and instructions were 
modified based on the pilot tests. Using the pilot data, we conducted initial manipulation checks and 
found all manipulations to be successful.  
  
Eight hundred and sixty-five participants from students and staff in a large Midwestern university 
participated in the experiment—437 participated in the online-pharmacies domain, and 428 
participated in the online-banks domain. Table 3 reports the profile information for the two domains. 
 
Table 3. Participant Profiles 
Profile 
variables 
Mean STD 
Pharm 
(n = 437) 
Bank 
(n = 428) 
Pooled 
(n = 865) 
Pharm 
(n = 437) 
Bank 
(n = 428) 
Pooled 
(n = 865) 
Age 22.4 20.5 21.5 5.6 4.0 4.9 
Education* 3.2 3.0 3.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Hours spent 
daily on the 
Internet 
3.7 3.6 3.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Gender Male (%) Female (%) 
 64.3% 60.0% 62.2% 35.7% 40.0% 37.8% 
* Education scales, 1 = Some school, no degree, 2 = High school graduate, 3 = Some college, no degree/college students, 4 = 
Professional degree/2-year associate degree, 5 = Bachelor’s degree, 6 = Master’s degree, 7 = Doctoral degree. 
5. Analysis and Results 
5.1. Manipulation and Saliency Checks 
In the post-experiment survey, participants were asked to assess the detector’s run time speed, 
accuracy and the cost of making one wrong decision based on what they had experienced in the 
experiment, which we had manipulated during the experiment. Table 4 reports the results of three 
ANOVA tests for the two samples as well as the pooled sample.  
 
The results supported the success of manipulation. Furthermore, regression analyses of response 
efficacy, coping self-efficacy, effort requirement, and loss due to detector error with the corresponding 
tool elements (accuracy, speed, and cost of error) had statistically significant coefficients in all the 
three samples (pharmacies, banks, and pooled). This indicated that participants formed their 
perceptions of tool elements based on the manipulated values of these elements. 
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Table 4. Manipulation Checks for Tool Elements 
Manipulation 
 
Assessment 
questiona 
 
Means (STD) F-Value (d.f.) 
 
Sig. diff. 
  Level 1 Level 2 
Detection time 
(1 vs. 4 
seconds) 
 
The detection 
time of the tool 
was: 
 
Phb 1.84 (1.82) 4.11 (1.24) 223.08*** (1, 418) Yes 
Bk 2.08 (2.12) 4.39 (1.47) 170.67*** (1, 426) Yes 
Pl 1.96 (1.98) 4.25 (1.37) 383.48*** (1,846) Yes 
Detection 
accuracy (60% 
vs. 90%) 
 
The tool 
accuracy was: 
 
Ph 0.57 (0.16) 0.73 (0.23) 70.32*** (1, 415) Yes 
Bk 0.59 (0.17) 0.77 (0.20) 105.15*** (1, 426) Yes 
Pl 0.59 (0.16) 0.75 (0.20) 172.18*** (1, 843) Yes 
Cost per wrong 
decision ($1 vs. 
$10) 
 
The cost of 
making one 
wrong decision 
was: 
 
Ph 2.64 (3.29) 9.81(1.65) 807.37*** (1,423) Yes 
Bk 2.75 (3.14) 9.87 (1.60) 873.81*** (1,426) Yes 
Pl 2.69 (3.21) 9.84 (1.62) 1682.18*** (1, 851) Yes 
a The lead part of those assessment questions is “When it comes to some features of the tool you just experienced in the 
experiment”; b Ph = pharmacy (n = 437), Bk = bank (n = 428), and Pl = pooled (n = 865); *** p<0.001. 
5.2. Validity and Reliability Checks 
We carried out exploratory factor analyses (EFA) to check the convergent and discriminant validity of 
the constructs in the pharmacies and banks samples, as recommended by the literature (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1982; Moore & Benbasat, 1991; Straub, Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). All measurement items 
correctly loaded on the corresponding constructs. Appendix B reports all item loadings are greater 
than 0.70, and no cross loadings are greater than 0.40 (McKnight et al., 2002). Therefore, the 
convergent and discriminant validities of the constructs were supported.  
 
Table 5 reports the results of reliability checks. Cronbach alpha values were greater than the cutoff 
value of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978), and composite factor reliability (CFR) values were above the 
threshold of 0.70 (Segars 1997). The average variance extracted (AVE) values were above the cutoff 
value of 0.50 (Segars, 1997). Hence, the reliability checks support the reliability of the constructs.  
 
Table 5. Construct Reliability Checks 
Constructs Pharmacy Bank 
Cronbach's α CFR AVE Cronbach's α CFR AVE 
Detector response 
efficacy 
.97 .97 .91 .97 .97 .92 
Coping self-efficacy .93 .93 .81 .93 .93 .81 
Threat severity .93 .93 .81 .93 .93 .82 
Threat susceptibility .94 .94 .83 .94 .94 .84 
Reliance on the 
detector 
.94 .94 .84 .94 .94 .85 
Cost of error .87 .87 .69 .86 .86 .68 
 
By comparing the square root of the AVE for each construct with its correlations with all other 
constructs, we checked for further evidence of the discriminant validity of the constructs. The square 
root of AVE for each construct was greater than the correlation values with other constructs (Table 6), 
further supporting the discriminant validity of the constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
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Table 6. Construct Correlations and Comparison with Square Root of AVEs 
Constructs (Pharmacy) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Threat susceptibility 0.91 a      
2. Threat severity 0.28 0.90     
3. Reliance on the detector 0.05 0.03 0.92    
4. Cost of error 0.15 0.10 -0.05 0.94   
5. Detector response efficacy -0.01 -0.03 0.53 -0.21 0.83  
6. Coping self-efficacy -0.01 0.02 0.21 -0.31 0.25 0.90 
Constructs (Bank) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Threat susceptibility 0.92      
2. Threat severity 0.16 0.91     
3. Reliance on the detector 0.04 0.15 0.92    
4. Cost of error -0.02 0.22 -0.07 0.82   
5. Detector response efficacy 0.01 0.14 0.48 -0.33 0.96  
6. Coping self-efficacy 0.04 0.02 0.14 -0.40 0.34 0.90 
a The square root values of the AVEs are highlighted on the diagonal. 
 
To minimize common method variance (CMV), as suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), we used 
semantic differential scales in the instrument to increase the proximal and methodological separation 
and to reduce “acquiescence bias” caused by respondents’ possible tendency to provide socially 
desirable answers and/or to agree with the researcher (Chin et al., 2008).  
 
Furthermore, we collected data in multiple stages of the experiment (before, during, and after the 
experiment), hence creating time intervals between the collection the perceptual data. After data 
collection, we conducted the exploratory factor analysis. As Appendix B reports, no single factor 
emerged as a dominant factor, and multiple factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one. We 
then conducted Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to further test for the presence of 
CMV. We found that the single factor accounted for 17.0 percent, 18.8 percent, and 17.7 percent of 
the variances of the online-pharmacies sample, online-banks sample, and pooled sample, 
respectively, which were desirably below the 20 percent threshold used in the literature (Igbaria, 
Zinatelli, Cragg, & Cavaye, 1997; Song & Zahedi, 2005). However, to further minimize any potential 
threat of common method variance, we used the data of a marker variable (specifically collected for 
this purpose) to purify our data; thus, the CMV was factored out (Bagozzi, 2011; Podsakoff et al., 
2003; Song & Zahedi, 2005). We purified our data by regressing each item on the marker variable 
and using the regression residuals for data analysis. This process factors out common method bias 
from the data (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We used the purified data in the analysis.  
5.3. Measurement Model 
The measurement model was estimated by using the mean-adjusted maximum likelihood (MLM) 
method in MPlus, which adjusts for non-normality in data. Per Table 7, all fit indices of the 
measurement model were better than recommended thresholds, indicating a good fit for the 
measurement model.  
 
Table 7. Measurement Model and DTI Model Fit Indexes 
Fit index Measurement model DTI model Threshold* 
Normed χ2 1.41 1.85 <3.0 
CFI (comparative fit index) 0.991 0.960 >0.90 
TLI (Tucker-Lewis index) 0.990 0.957 >0.90 
RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation 0.031 0.044 <0.06 
SRMR (standardized root mean square residual) 0.029 0.086 <0.10 
 *Based on Bentler (1992), Bentler & Bonnett (1980), Browne & Cudeck (1993), Hu & Bentler (1999) 
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Confirmatory factor analysis (see Appendix C) shows that the standardized factor loadings of all 
factors were greater than 0.70, which is satisfactory (Bagozzi, 2011). Moreover, all t-values for the 
factor loadings were well above the 2.54 cut-off value (Muthén & Muthén, 2003). The high and 
statistically significant R2 values, ranging from 0.54 to 0.94 for the pharmacies sample and 0.53 to 
0.95 for the banks sample, indicated that the items were appropriate for measuring the corresponding 
constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). 
5.4. Model Estimation  
We used the group analysis approach with MLM algorithm in MPlus to estimate the DTI model with 
two groups: online pharmacies and online banks. Per Table 7, all the fit indices of the DTI model were 
better than the recommended thresholds, indicating good model fit and supporting our theoretical 
model in both online pharmacies and online banks domains. Figure 2 reports the path coefficients, p-
values for one-tailed t-statistic tests, and R2 values of the estimation for the DTI model for both the 
online-pharmacies domain (the top values in Figure 2) and the online-banks domain (the bottom 
values in Figure 2). Significant control variables are reported in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3. Results of the DTI Model Estimation 
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Figure 4. Results for Control Variables in the DTI Model 
 
The R2 values of all endogenous variables in the model were statistically significant, which 
demonstrates that the model has reasonable explanatory power.  
5.4.1. Hypothesized Paths  
Of the 11 hypothesized paths in the DTI model, 10 were statistically significant at least in one of the 
two domains (Figure 2). H1 and H2 were related to the influence of detector accuracy on detector 
response efficacy and coping self-efficacy. The results supported H1 and H2 in the two domains, 
indicating the importance of detector accuracy in coping appraisal. The impact of detector speed on 
the perception about detector response efficacy and coping self-efficacy were hypothesized in H3 and 
H4, respectively. The results provided full support for H3 in both domains and for H4 in the 
pharmacies domain.  
 
The high and significant R2 values for detector response efficacy for both domains (0.43 and 0.41, 
p<0.001) attest to the explanatory power of tool performance in forming users’ perceptions regarding 
detector response efficacy. R2 values for coping self-efficacy were also significant in both domains 
(0.09 and 0.13, p<0.001), but at a lower level, indicating the existence of other factors in forming 
users’ coping self-efficacy.  
 
The influence of cost of detector error on threat severity and threat susceptibility was hypothesized in 
H5 and H6, respectively. Comparing the path coefficients in the two domains for H5 shows that cost 
of error had significant impact on perceived threat severity in both domains. Its influence was twice as 
large in the banks domain as in the pharmacies domain. For H6, cost of error had significant impact 
on threat susceptibility in the pharmacies domain but not in the banks domain, indicating that cost of 
error in the banks domain had its greatest impact on threat severity. This makes sense since cost of 
error in online banks has more immediate financial implications. Hence, detection error is perceived 
to cause more severe financial consequences. 
 
Hypotheses H7-H8 posited that coping appraisal constructs (detector response efficacy and coping self-
efficacy) impact the reported reliance on the detector. The results showed that detector response efficacy 
(H7) was the primary motivator for reliance on the detector in both domains with almost equally high path 
coefficients. This is in line with findings of Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, and Rogers (2000) that coping variables 
are stronger behavior motivators than threat variables, and the report by Milne et al. (2000) that “threat 
appraisal is a poor predictor of intention and behaviors” (p. 134). Coping self-efficacy (H8) was significant 
for only online banks. The result showed that the secondary motivator of detector use depends on domain. 
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In online pharmacies where the threat is less severe in terms of direct financial loss, coping self-efficacy 
acts as the secondary motivator of reliance on the detector, whereas in online banks with immediate 
financial consequences, threat severity is a stronger motivator of reliance on the detector.  
 
H9 and H10 posited that threat appraisal constructs (threat severity and threat susceptibility) are the 
antecedents of the reported reliance on the detector. The path for H10 was not significant in either 
domain, which indicated threat susceptibility had little role in reliance on the detector. However, threat 
severity was significant in the banks domain, indicating that when the threat involves direct financial 
consequences, threat severity motivates individuals to heed the detector’s advice when visiting 
financial websites. The statistically significant R2 values of reliance on the detector in both domains 
(0.30 and 0.24, p<0.001) indicate that the extent of reliance of the detector could be significantly 
explained by its hypothesized antecedents in the model. 
 
H11 posited that reliance on the detector improves users’ actual performance in terms of self-
protection against-fake website attacks by avoiding visiting and transacting with fake websites. This 
hypothesis was strongly supported with high path coefficient values for both domains. Considering 
the fact that performance was objectively measured, the statistically significant R2 values of 0.19 and 
0.15 for the two domains show that the improvement in individuals’ security protection is noteworthy. 
5.4.2. Control Variables  
For the sake of clarity, we report the significant impacts of control variables in Figure 4. The context-
sensitivity in terms of threat type was used as a control since we argued that it influences users’ self-
protection performance. The results showed that threat type had significant impact on user 
performance in the online banks domain, but not in the online pharmacies domain. This is a novel 
finding, indicating that in certain domains with direct financial consequences, the threat of spoofed 
fake websites could reduce users’ efforts in self-protection more than that of concocted websites. We 
also found that users’ self-protection performance improved with age since age had equally 
significant path coefficients in both domains. It seems that the combination of spoofed threat type and 
younger age (with less experience or focus) could significantly increase users’ vulnerabilities. 
 
The impacts of security habit on coping self-efficacy and threat severity were significant in both 
domains. The differential influence of security habit was stark in the case of threat severity, where the 
path coefficient value was 60 percent higher in the banks domain, indicating the importance of 
security habit in the perception of threat severity.  
 
Several control variables had significant impacts on threat susceptibility. Threat awareness, past 
encounters with fake-websites, and gender had significant influence on threat susceptibility in both 
domains. The high significance of threat awareness and past encounters with fake websites show 
that personal knowledge and experience played a major role in the perception of susceptibility to 
security threat. Furthermore, women felt more susceptible to threats than men in both domains with 
almost identical path coefficients. This finding is in line with other IT-related studies indicating gender 
differences in dealing with IT and risky conditions (e.g., Leonard & Cronan, 2001, Venkatesh et al. 
2003). Education was not significant as a control variable. Together, these results indicate that users’ 
profiles have significant influence on their perceptions of security-related constructs, which, in turn, 
impact their reliance on detection tools and their threat-prevention performance. 
5.4.3. Context-Sensitivity with Respect to Domain Type  
H12 posited that domain moderates the paths in the DTI model. We conducted the pairwise t-test of 
path coefficients, using pooled standard errors to test for context-sensitivity (Table 8).  
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Table 8. Pairwise T-Test of Domain Differences 
Antecedent and consequent paths 
Path coefficient Pairwise 
t-test Pharmacy  Bank 
Detector response efficacy    
H1: Detector accuracyResponse efficacy 0.59*** 0.51*** ns 
H3: Detector speedResponse efficacy  0.13*** 0.23*** † 
H7: Response efficacy Reliance on the detector 0.52*** 0.48*** ns 
Coping self-efficacy    
H2: Detector accuracy Coping self-efficacy  0.10* 0.27*** ** 
H4: Detector speedCoping self-efficacy  0.18* ns ** & st 
H8: Self-efficacyReliance on the detector 0.09** ns * & st 
Threat severity    
H5: Cost of errorSeverity 0.11** 0.21*** † 
H9: SeverityReliance on the detector  ns 0.09* * & st 
Threat susceptibility    
H6: Cost of errorSusceptibility 0.10** ns * & st  
H10: SusceptibilityReliance on the detector  ns ns ns 
Reliance on the detector    
H11: Reliance on the detectorActual performance 0.42*** 0.36*** ns 
***p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05, †p<0.1, ns = not significant, st = structurally different (one path is significant and the other is 
insignificant). 
 
The results showed that domain did not play a significant moderating role in the paths from detector 
performance (accuracy and speed) to reliance on the detector, except for a directional influence of 
speed on response efficacy. In other words, the paths (detector performanceresponse 
efficacyuser reliance) were statistically and strongly significant in both domains and were not 
sensitive to the two domain types. However, paths from detector performance to user reliance (H2, 
H4, and H8) were significantly sensitive to the type of domain. This indicates that context-sensitivity of 
domain type exerts its moderating influence on the paths from detector performance to users’ reliance 
on the detector via coping self-efficacy. 
 
The results also indicated the presence of context-sensitivity in paths from cost of detector error to 
user reliance via threat perceptions (severity and susceptibility). The paths cost of error  severity  
user reliance exhibited statistically significant context-sensitivity, although the path cost of error  
severity was marginally significant. The path cost of error  susceptibility also showed significant 
context-sensitivity. Finally, the path from user reliance on users’ actual performance in self-protection 
did not exhibit significant context-sensitivity.  
6. Discussion 
In this study we examined the influence of benefit and cost of detection tools in promoting users’ 
reliance on such tools and their actual self-protection performance; and whether context-sensitivity 
has any role in this process. We relied on the core constructs of the protection motivation theory 
(PMT) and contextualized it to develop the DTI theory, thus extending PMT through the introduction 
of “context-specificity” and “context-sensitivity.” 
 
We identified the candidate salient tool elements based on theory and empirical research in the 
literature and conceptualized the model using the DTI theory. Based on an elaborate and extensive 
experimental design, we explored how manipulated perceptions of users with respect to performance-
related elements of detection tools, cost of detection error and contextual factors impact users’ threat 
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appraisal and coping appraisal.  We also investigated the consequent impacts of such perceptions on 
the extent of reliance on detection tools and users’ actual performance in self-protection. 
 
First, detector performance, in terms of accuracy and speed, showed a profound influence on user 
reliance on the detector via the coping appraisal constructs. Moreover, detector response efficacy as 
a coping mechanism emerged as the single pivotal factor linking detection tools’ performance to 
users’ reliance on such tools and subsequently to users’ actual performance in self-protection. The 
sheer dominance of response efficacy is a novel finding for creating and promoting fake-website 
detection tools. People generally are not good at detecting deceptions (Biros et al., 2002; DePaulo et 
al., 1985). Hence, a great deal of effort is allocated to increasing accuracy and reducing the run time 
of such tools (Abbasi & Chen, 2009a). Our results shed light on the importance of such research and 
indicate that detection tools should be developed, assessed, and marketed based on these 
performance criteria. Furthermore, we found that path coefficients linking performance elements and 
reliance via response efficacy are not context sensitive. This lack of context-sensitivity points to the 
broadly generalizable importance of the role of perceptions about tools’ response efficacy in 
promoting users’ reliance and self-protection performance. 
 
Second, most IS studies treat self-efficacy as an exogenous variable and do not examine forces 
contributing to its change. Our work showed that detector’s performance increases users’ coping self-
efficacy. This is a novel finding since it indicates that users make a connection between the “ability” of 
an IT artifact and their own ability. The detector accuracy and to some degree its speed enhance 
users’ perception about their own ability to fight against online security threats. Prior research has 
shown that users feel better about themselves and their capabilities when using more powerful 
decision making aids (Hung, 2003). In the context of security behavior research, this finding shows 
that the detector has the potential to merge with users’ ego and to become part of their self-
perception—“I have more ability since I have a more powerful tool” (in terms of its accuracy and 
speed in detecting and preventing the threat).  
 
Third, another major finding in this research is the strong and significant context-sensitivity in the 
paths from detector performance to users’ reliance on the detector via coping self-efficacy. This 
finding indicates that detectors’ accuracy has a strong impact on users’ coping self-efficacy in the 
online banking domain. Thus, users’ self-empowerment requires developing and marketing tools that 
boast a high accuracy rate in financially sensitive domains. However, coping self-efficacy does not 
promote reliance in such domains. Our result suggests that when it comes to financially sensitive 
domains, such as online banks, it is response efficacy of the detector that prompts users to rely on 
them. Their own coping self-efficacy counts little in this process. This could be the consequence of 
familiarity with the domain. Subjects in the online bank domain were twice as familiar with the domain 
as those in the online-pharmacies domain (with t-test significance of p<0.001). It is possible that the 
influence of self-efficacy on reliance on the detector is not only moderated by the domain but also by 
the extent of familiarity with the domain. This is a line of research that needs further investigation.  
 
Together, these findings regarding self-efficacy point to the potential for a new theoretical framework 
in perceiving protective IT artifacts as the extension of self in dealing with online threats. As such, 
designers of protective IT artifacts must pay closer attention to the psychology of users for whom the 
tools are being designed and domains in which they are used, thus highlighting the need for 
protective IT artifacts that have intelligence and can be personalized. 
 
Fourth, another major finding in this work is the strong and significant role of user reliance on the 
detector in objectively assessed user performance in self-protection against fake-website threats. 
While implied anecdotally in prior studies (Wu et al., 2006; Dhamija et al., 2006), we believe our result 
is the first to establish that users’ reliance on the detector has significant impact with high path 
coefficient values on users’ performance in multiple contexts. The fact that the path coefficients were 
almost equally high in both online-pharmacy and online-bank domains shows that, by relying on the 
detector, users significantly improve their success in avoiding fake-website threats regardless of the 
domain type. 
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Fifth, the impact of cost of detector error on users’ threat appraisal was context sensitive. Cost of 
detector error had much larger impact on the perception of threat severity, which, in turn, significantly 
influenced reported reliance in the online-banks domain, whereas it had no significant impact in the 
online-pharmacies domain. Losses attributable to fake online banks were perceived as more 
consequential than losses attributable to purchasing drugs from fake online pharmacies, possibly due 
to the fact that our sample was comprised of younger subjects.  
 
However, cost of detector error had little influence on users’ perception of threat susceptibility. We 
observed its significant impact on threat susceptibility only in the online-pharmacies domain. 
Furthermore, threat susceptibility as a mediator of cost of detector error on user reliance had no 
support in either of the two domains. 
 
Sixth, we examined context-sensitivity with respect to threat type. We argued that, due to the lack of 
users’ awareness of threat type, it influences only their self-protection performance. Hence, we 
examined its role as a control variable. The results supported this argument, indicating that users’ 
performance deteriorates when the threat goes from concocted to spoofed fake website. This makes 
sense since spoofed fake websites imitate familiar and well-known websites, which makes it harder 
for users to detect the deception. We also found that age has a positive influence on user 
performance. It seems that there is a need to educate younger users regarding the threat of fake-
website attacks, particularly about spoofed attacks. 
 
Seventh, the significant roles of security habit, threat awareness, and past encounters with fake 
websites indicate that users’ knowledge, experience and habit are salient in their security behaviors 
and performance. Moreover, the significance of gender shows that women feel more susceptible. 
Together, these results indicate the need to take into account the users’ personal profiles in 
developing protective tools and the need for an intelligent approach to the design of detection tools. 
7. Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions 
7.1. Theoretical Implications 
This paper makes a number of novel contributions to theory. Following the theory development 
arguments by Hong et al. (2014), Johns (2006), Whetten et al. (2009), and Whetten (2009), we 
borrowed and extended the protection motivation theory (PMT) by contextualizing it—introducing 
“context specificity” and investigating its “context sensitivity.” This led to the detection tool impact 
(DTI) theory. The DTI theory’s “context specificity” involved core antecedent variables (in terms of 
detector benefit and cost) and outcome variables (in terms of users’ reliance on the detector and 
users’ actual self-protection performance). We examined the theory’s context-sensitivity by 
investigating the role of domain type and threat type. The contextualized DTI theory is a novel 
theoretical contribution of this work, which opens a new avenue for its extension and elaboration to 
other types of security tool. 
 
Second, this study found that accuracy and speed of the detector and perceived detector response 
efficacy are the most important factors in users’ utilization of detection tools to counter online 
deceptions. Our work shows that the intellectual investment in improving accuracy and speed is 
indeed a worthwhile endeavor that should be used in publicizing the performance of detection tools. 
 
Third, our work is the first to show the strong link between the reported reliance on detection tools 
and users’ actual performance in avoiding fake-website attacks. It shows the critical paths of detector 
performancedetector response efficacyreliance on the detectoruser self-protection 
performance in two domains. Although the paths look intuitive, there is little evidence in the literature 
in conceptualizing and scientifically testing their significance. Such evidence is needed in order to 
convince internet users that the extra effort involved in using detection tools actually pays off in 
protecting them against fake-website attacks.  
 
Fourth, our findings uncovered the ways to enhance users’ coping self-efficacy through suitable 
development of detection tools. Our findings show that users may view protective IT artifacts as an 
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extension of their selves, thus reinforcing the need to combine the design science approach with 
behavioral theories to fit protective IT artifacts to individuals’ psychology in order to promote their use. 
Reinforcing this ego-boosting perspective of protective tools is the role of self-efficacy, which can be 
enhanced through performance elements of tools, leading to users’ reliance on the detector as moderated 
by domain type. This is a novel finding that opens a new avenue of research into self-efficacy’s role in 
dealing with security threats and the design of intelligent tools with personalization capabilities. 
 
Finally, this study contributes to design science research by proposing and empirically testing the DTI 
model by which design science scholars can test and evaluate various salient elements of protective 
IT artifacts. Given the differences in the theoretical foundation for adoption behaviors and for 
avoidance behaviors (Liang & Xue, 2009), the DTI model may be a more suitable and specialized 
alternative to the technology acceptance model as an evaluation model for protective IT artifacts. 
7.2. Practical Implications 
This study provides a framework for the empirical design and evaluation of protective IT artifacts. By 
manipulating performance and context elements under this framework, designers can test and evaluate 
the usability and effectiveness of various design prototypes of a protective IT artifact. The implications for 
practice are far-reaching. First, based on the findings of this study, to increase adoption of a protective IT 
artifact, designers need to focus on users’ coping appraisal process. Second, perceived response efficacy 
could be used as a metric for evaluating designs of protective tools, assessing their performance, and 
promoting their use. This provides a clear and consistent strategy for security software and Web browser 
development companies that produce such tools. Although satisfaction has emerged as a perceptual 
construct to gauge customers’ behaviors, users’ perceived response efficacy as a metric of users’ 
behavior and perception has not received adequate recognition. Our results underline the importance of 
this metric for measuring users’ perceptions and behaviors. 
 
Third, the findings show that tool developers should strive for maximum accuracy and speed in 
application domains. Fake-website detection tool developers routinely balance two competing 
considerations: accuracy versus runtime. Research has shown that tools that incorporate a larger, 
more sophisticated set of signatures (i.e., “fraud cues”) are capable of detecting fake websites with 
greater accuracy but at the expense of longer runtimes; in some cases, several seconds longer per 
detection (Abbasi & Chen, 2009b). Interestingly, in our study, users showed a clear preference for 
“having the cake and eating it too,” with more accurate, faster detection garnering the highest 
response efficacy.  
 
Fourth, software companies that produce detectors should pay special attention to the potential 
market for intelligent tools that can be personalized based on the domain of websites as well as on 
users’ traffic patterns and profiles. Personalization could increase the efficacy of detectors and 
people’s interest in using them. Personalized intelligent detectors could be either free standing tools 
or integrated with intelligent assistants on which users rely for various personal tasks.  
 
Finally, our findings suggest that increasing reliance on detection tools might be accomplished 
through positively promoting individuals’ coping appraisal. Protective tools are normally promoted by 
highlighting risk, susceptibility and negative consequences of exposure to threats. Our work shows 
that organizations and companies with the mandate of promoting security tools may also find value in 
leveraging positive campaigns that increase public awareness of the accuracies and runtime speeds 
associated with protective tools. The collective reliance on such tools could reduce the success of 
fake websites and increase online security. 
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This study has limitations. We collected our data for two sensitive domains—online pharmacies and 
online banks. Therefore, our results should be interpreted within these domains. In addition, our 
participants interacted with detection tool stimuli that were not embedded in an Internet browser or 
running as a real-time system. This could be considered a limitation. However, our stimuli closely 
imitated main features of existing detection tools while eliminating brand name bias. Thus, 
participants had a unified experiment platform and, consequently, variances due to participants’ 
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varying experiences and knowledge of specific tools were removed. Further, this study was 
conducted within an academic environment, mostly with younger undergraduate and graduate 
students. Although such a population represents a large proportion of Internet users, care must be 
taken in generalizing our findings to other populations such of those in other countries and older 
adults. However, it is important to note that fake websites are a pertinent problem for the population 
segment utilized in this study. The two most commonly targeted groups for fake-website attacks are 
students and the elderly (Ramzan & Wuest, 2007). In the context of online banking, younger people 
(between 18 and 34) are major users of online banking and are also susceptible to online banking-
related security threats (McAfee, 2011a). In the context of online pharmacies, 25 percent to 30 
percent of people under the age of 35 take at least one prescription drug, and well over 40 percent 
take over-the-counter medication (Maris, 2012; Center for Disease Control, 2010). Moreover, younger 
people and students are just as likely to use online pharmacies as other segments of the population 
(Orizio, Merla, Schulz, & Gelatti, 2011). Therefore, we believe that using a student population to study 
fake-website detection security behavior in the online banking and online pharmacy domains is 
warranted. However, future research should also be conducted on older and non-student populations. 
For instance, as alluded to earlier, it would be interesting to see how these other populations perceive 
losses in different domains such as online banking and online pharmacies.  
 
This paper has proposed a number of research avenues for building theories that combine the 
strength of design science and behavioral science in creating compelling personalized protective IT 
artifacts. Another direction of future research is the use of the DTI theory and model in examining the 
salient elements for other protective IT artifacts. In situations where a tool may provide detection 
capabilities for several threats with varying levels of accuracy and speed, it remains unclear how 
response efficacy for individual tool components (as well as the tool as a whole) would be impacted. 
Further research investigating salient elements for such enterprise-level security tools with several 
protective capabilities including fake-website detection, anti-virus, malware protection, intrusion 
detection, and so on, is warranted. Finally, other Internet usage domains—particularly hedonic 
domains such as online games and social networking—could be explored in future research. It is 
possible that the impacts of the detector’s salient elements in hedonic domains will be different from 
those in utilitarian domains such as the online pharmacies and online banks employed in this study.  
 
This paper is part of a larger, federally funded project that involves investigating fake-website 
detection tools in terms of performance-related elements, user-interface elements, multiple domains, 
and personalization through intelligent user interface. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Instrument 
 
Table A-1. Instrument 
Constructs Code Items 
Detector response 
efficacy 
 In evaluating the detection performance of the DS (Detection System) to assist me to successfully avoid fake websites, I believe that, the DS was 
res1* not helpful at all/very helpful for sure 
res2 not valuable at all/very valuable for sure 
res3 not useful at all/very useful for sure 
Cost of detector error 
 When it comes to the cost of following a wrong recommendation made by the DS, I believe that, 
cost1 the extent of my loss was (very low/very high ) 
cost2 The amount of money I lost was (very low/very high) 
cost3 In general, the consequence of errors made by the DS was (not severe at all/very severe for sure) 
Coping self-efficacy 
 When it comes to my ability to take protective actions against fake websites, I believe that 
self1 my knowledge for taking protective actions is (not adequate at all / very adequate for sure) 
self2 my ability to take protective actions is (very low/very high) 
self3 for me, taking protective actions is (very difficult/very easy) 
Threat Severity 
 When it comes to the severity of damage due to using fake websites , I believe that 
sev1 the extent of my potential damages due to using fake websites is (very low/very high) 
sev2 my possible loss due to using fake websites is (very low/very high) 
sev3 for me, the extent of the negative consequences of using fake websites (very low/very high) 
Threat Susceptibility 
 When it comes to the likelihood of encountering fake websites, I believe that 
sus1 the chance of my encountering fake websites is (very low/very high) 
sus2 the likelihood that I would encounter fake websites is (very low/very high) 
sus3 the possibility of my encountering fake websites is (very low/very high) 
Reported reliance on 
the detector 
rel1 During the experiment, the extent to which I followed the advice of the DS was (very low/very high) 
rel2 In making my decisions during the experiment, the extent of my reliance on the DS advice was (very low/very high) 
rel3 In informing my opinions about the website in the experiment, the extent of my reliance on the DS advice was (very low/very high) 
Threat awareness 
 When it comes to my awareness of fake websites, I 
awe1 don't know anything about them/ know a lot about them 
awe2 haven't heard about them at all/ have heard a lot about them for sure 
awe3 am not familiar with them at all/ am very familiar with them for sure 
Security habit 
 When using the web, for me, taking security precautions is 
hab1 not in my nature at all/in my nature for sure 
hab2 not routine at all/very routine for sure 
hab3 not habitual at all/very habitual for sure 
Past encounters with 
fake websites 
past1 When it comes to my past encounters with fake websites, the number of my encounters has been (very low/very high) 
past2 the number of fake websites I visited has been (very low/very high) 
past3 the frequency of my encounters with fake websites has been (very low/very high) 
Perceived detector 
accuracy Acc I believe this accuracy it was: not acceptable at all/was acceptable for sure 
Perceived detector 
speed speed I believe that this detection time was: not acceptable at all/was acceptable for sure 
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Table B-1. Exploratory Factor Analysis for the DTI Model 
Constructs Items 
Pharmacies Banks 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cost of 
detector error 
 
cost1 -.02 -.04 .07 -.13 .09 .88 -.03 .00 -.01 .18 -.14 .86 
cost2 -.05 -.04 .09 -.18 .03 .88 -.14 -.10 -.02 .06 -.23 .86 
cost3 -.19 .05 .01 -.05 .00 .87 -.23 .06 .01 .07 -.11 .84 
Response 
efficacy 
res1 .91 .29 .00 .10 -.02 -.12 .90 .27 .01 .06 .15 -.15 
res2 .93 .25 .01 .10 -.02 -.09 .92 .23 .00 .08 .15 -.13 
res3 .93 .23 -.01 .12 .00 -.08 .92 .23 .01 .06 .15 -.15 
Coping self-
efficacy 
self1 .13 .07 -.04 .91 .00 -.14 .13 .05 .04 .01 .89 -.22 
self2 .10 .08 .03 .93 .03 -.12 .18 .03 .02 .02 .93 -.16 
self3 .07 .12 .01 .91 -.03 -.10 .09 .08 -.01 .00 .92 -.10 
Threat 
susceptibility 
sus1 .01 .02 .93 -.02 .13 .05 .00 .03 .93 .11 .03 -.03 
sus2 .00 .02 .95 -.03 .13 .06 -.02 .01 .96 .05 .00 -.01 
sus3 .00 .01 .93 .05 .13 .06 .04 .01 .93 .08 .01 .02 
Threat severity 
sev1 .00 -.01 .12 .01 .93 .03 .08 .03 .08 .93 .02 .09 
sev2 -.02 .01 .14 .01 .94 .04 .07 .06 .08 .94 .01 .13 
sev3 -.01 .05 .12 -.01 .90 .06 .02 .10 .09 .91 .00 .08 
Reported 
reliance on the 
detector 
rel1 .19 .89 -.03 .13 .05 -.03 .19 .90 .01 .05 .08 -.04 
rel2 .27 .92 .02 .07 .01 .03 .21 .94 .02 .06 .06 .02 
rel3 .28 .91 .07 .09 .00 -.02 .25 .91 .02 .09 .02 -.01 
Eigenvalue 4.8 3.5 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.3 5.0 3.4 2.7 2.1 1.5 1.2 
Cumulative variance 
explained (%) 15.7 30.6 45.5 60.1 74.7 87.9 15.5 30.7 45.6 60.4 75.2 88.4 
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Appendix C: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 
Table C-1. Results of Confirmatory Factory Analysis (Purified Data) 
Constructs 
 
Items 
 
Pharmacies Banks 
Loading t-value R2 Loading t-value R2 
Cost of detector error 
 
cost1 0.81 40.55 0.66 0.81 39.11 0.65 
cost2 0.88 40.29 0.77 0.88 50.07 0.77 
cost3 0.80 34.10 0.63 0.79 32.58 0.62 
Detector response efficacy 
 
res1 0.94 108.94 0.89 0.95 101.70 0.90 
res2 0.97 178.83 0.94 0.96 88.58 0.92 
res3 0.96 141.68 0.91 0.96 119.70 0.92 
Coping self-efficacy 
 
self1 0.89 53.87 0.78 0.89 54.97 0.79 
self2 0.95 64.93 0.89 0.96 70.98 0.92 
self3 0.87 48.61 0.75 0.86 55.07 0.74 
Threat susceptibility 
 
sus1 0.89 56.40 0.80 0.90 58.16 0.81 
sus2 0.95 89.44 0.91 0.96 95.36 0.92 
sus3 0.89 52.46 0.79 0.89 56.93 0.80 
Threat severity 
 
sev1 0.90 56.83 0.81 0.91 61.85 0.83 
sev2 0.95 67.81 0.91 0.95 68.31 0.90 
sev3 0.85 41.52 0.72 0.86 43.48 0.74 
Reliance on the detector 
 
rel1 0.84 40.20 0.70 0.85 52.18 0.73 
rel2 0.97 126.44 0.93 0.97 140.71 0.95 
rel3 0.94 95.59 0.89 0.93 75.34 0.87 
Threat awareness 
 
awa1 0.88 55.75 0.77 0.87 56.23 0.76 
awa2 0.74 27.66 0.54 0.73 32.04 0.53 
awa3 0.93 68.61 0.87 0.91 49.22 0.83 
Security habit 
 
hab1 0.88 51.59 0.78 0.90 57.41 0.81 
hab2 0.97 124.44 0.94 0.96 81.15 0.92 
hab3 0.95 111.30 0.90 0.96 142.88 0.92 
Past encounters with fake 
websites 
 
past1 0.80 30.13 0.64 0.84 37.74 0.71 
past2 0.88 39.04 0.77 0.90 42.65 0.81 
past3 0.88 41.52 0.77 0.91 55.93 0.83 
 
  
 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 16, Issue 6, pp. 448-484, June 2015 
 483 
 
Zahedi et al. / Fake-Website Detection Tools 
About the Authors 
Fatemeh Mariam ZAHEDI is a professor and Roger L. Fitzsimonds Distinguished Scholar at the 
Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She has received her 
doctoral degree from Indiana University.  Her areas of research include design and behavior issues in 
Web-based IT systems, including trust, privacy, and security. She has served as SE and AE of MIS 
Quarterly, editorial board of JMIS, and AE of ISR. She has published more than 120 referred papers 
in premier journals and conferences, including MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Journal 
of Management Information Systems, Management Science, IEEE Transactions on Software 
Engineering, Operations Research, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, IIE 
Transactions, and Review of Economics and Statistics, and others. She has been the PI of grants 
funded by NSF and other agencies.  She is the author of two books: Quality Information Systems and 
Intelligent Systems for Business: Expert Systems with Neural Network. She has received several 
research, teaching, and best paper awards.  Her work has been featured in TV and print media. The 
list of her publications is available on her Google Scholar profile. 
 
Ahmed ABBASI is an associate professor of information technology and director of the Center for 
Business Analytics in the McIntire School of Commerce at the University of Virginia. He attained his 
B.S. and MBA degrees from Virginia Tech, and a Ph.D. from the University of Arizona. He has 
published more than 50 peer-reviewed articles in top journals and conference proceedings, including 
MIS Quarterly, Journal of Management Information Systems, ACM Transactions on Information 
Systems, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, and IEEE Intelligent Systems. His 
projects on Internet fraud, cyber security, and social media analytics have been funded through 
multiple grants from the National Science Foundation. He received the IBM Faculty Award and AWS 
Research Grant for his work on big data. He has also received best paper awards from MIS Quarterly, 
the Association for Information Systems, and the Workshop on Information Technologies and 
Systems. He serves as an associate editor for Information Systems Research, Decision Sciences 
Journal, ACM Transactions on MIS, and IEEE Intelligent Systems. His work has been featured in 
several media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, the Associated Press, and Fox News. 
 
Yan CHEN is an assistant professor at the College of Business, Auburn University at Montgomery. 
She received her PhD in MIS from the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. Her work has focused on 
information security, cyber espionage, privacy and e-commerce. Her research has been published in 
journals including the Journal of Management Information Systems and the Journal of Computer 
Information Systems, and a number of refereed conference proceedings. 
 
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 16, Issue 6, pp. 448-484, June 2015 
 
484 
